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ABSTRACT 
 
There are continuum problems in political economy. There are no objective non-debatable 
solutions to any of them. All answers to them are arbitrary. Responding to these chal-
lenges are, ideally, the responsibility of courts, juries, etc. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
There is a plethora of problems arising in the analysis of law and political 
economy having in common with each other that their challenge arises from 
the fact that they can be placed upon a continuum.  We argue that there is 
no real solution to this continuum problem, at least not in terms of distance, 
or time, or any other objective criterion. We consider physical invasions in 
section II. Section III is devoted to an exploration of continuums in age re-
lated issues and IV to homesteading. We conclude in section V. 
 
 
II. Physical invasion 
 
A. Crime 
 
First consider in the regard the garden-variety issue of the (threatened) 
punch in the nose.  If A shakes his fist right under B’s nose (3 inches away 
from making contact) while yelling at him, in the context where this can be 
construed as a real threat e.g., late at night in a restaurant known for its bar-
room brawls, or in a dark alley, then there is no doubt that B would be justi-
fied in taking all reasonable violent actions aimed at protecting himself.  
                                                          
1 We would like to thank Gary Herbert for help on an earlier draft of this paper. All re-
maining errors and infelicities are our own responsibility. 
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Were B to punch A first, or kick him in the crotch, or even stab or shoot him, 
any reasonable jury would characterize this as a defensive act, even though 
the first use of violent force emanated from B.  That is, A’s act would be con-
sidered enough of an immediate threat, a “clear and present danger,” such 
that B’s response would constitute not an invasion of another person, but 
rather a defense of himself. 
Now suppose that the threatening fist-shaking took place not 3 inches 
away from its intended victim, but rather 3 miles away.  Everything else re-
mains the same (we stipulate that B has super good eyesight2 and can per-
ceive this threatened action).  Would B be justified in resorting to deadly 
force in order to ward off this “threat”? Not at all.3  Even the meanest intel-
ligence would know that this is not a real threat. 
If the same action is a threat at 3 inches but not at 3 miles it follows ine-
luctably that at some point in between these two distances its very nature 
changes from the one to the other.  Suppose, as a first crack at this problem 
we pick some such point, say, 30 yards.  This means, if it means anything, 
that at 29 yards 11 inches it is permissible to reply to this act of fist shaking 
with dangerous, even deadly, force, while if it occurs at a distance of 30 yards 
and 1 inch, then all bets are off: if B responds physically in this situation, 
then it is he, B, not A, the fist shaker, who is guilty of engaging in criminal 
behavior. 
One problem with this answer is that the dividing line is so narrow: two 
inches in our example.  Of course, mathematically, lines are not at all as wide 
as that; indeed, their width approaches zero.  But no matter how wide, no so-
lutions are in sight.  If narrow, then there doesn’t seem to be much difference 
between either of the end points; if very wide, e.g., in the extreme, three miles 
minus three inches, we arrive back at the very problem we are attempting to 
solve. 
Another problem is that no matter what division between licit and illicit 
activities we choose, it is always possible to ask, “Well, if we move a small 
amount in one or the other of the two directions, how can that possibly make 
                                                          
2 We are indebted to Nozick (1974) for blazing the trail with regard to imaginary inven-
tions, abilities, situations and innovations that help shed light on philosophical puzzles. 
3 Barnett, 1998 discusses a death threat uttered in the context where it can only be actual-
ized in the future, and correctly maintains that it would still be justified in killing the 
threatener, even though the element of clear and present danger is lacking.  E.g., the case 
of the Fatwa issued against Salman Rushdie, the Indian British novelist.  The difference 
between the two cases is that it is not clear what the man is doing who waves his fist at 
the “nose” of someone else from three miles away, whereas the implication of the Fatwa is 
all too clear. For a critical review of Barnett, 1998, see Kinsella, 1998. 
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a difference.”  That is, in our case, if 30 yards is where the line is drawn in the 
sand, then why not 25 or 35 yards?; why not 29 or 31, for that matter.4 
How, then, can we solve the problem of whether or not a response or re-
taliation against a threat is justified or not, given the conditions as depicted 
above?  The only answer is that there is no answer, at least not one that ad-
mits of geographical extension.  That is, no single cut off point will be both 
reasonable and non arbitrary. 
What, then?  The answer forthcoming from this quarter is to utilize the 
“reasonable man”5 (Rothbard, 1990) standard.6  Under ideal conditions, were 
a jury shown a film of exactly what happened, guilt or innocence on the part 
of B for retaliating or engaging in a “first strike” against A would be based 
upon the evaluation of the danger B faced as evaluated by 12 disinterested7 
                                                          
4 There are some issues in libertarian crime theory that do admit of precision. For exam-
ple, that punishment shall consist of “two teeth for a tooth,” and not 1.9 or 2.1 “teeth.” 
See on this: Block, 2002-2003, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, forthcoming; Block, Barnett and Calla-
han, forthcoming; Olson, 1979; Rothbard, 1998, 88; Whitehead and Block, 2003. 
5 Some feminists have put forth a “reasonable woman” standard as an alternative (Ellison 
v Brady, 199, cited in McElroy, 2001, p. 38).  The present authors use the word “man” in 
the traditional sense, to include both men and women.  If women on balance are more 
fearful than the average human being, and men less so, then our standard would be 
pegged midpoint on this continuum.  That of the feminists would be skewed in favor of 
those on the risk avoider side of the fence. 
6  
http://dictionary.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/results.pl?co=dictionary.lp.findlaw.com&topic=1
9/194efb4cb63ca323ab32d9ae9418265e:  “A fictional person with an ordinary degree of 
reason, prudence, care, foresight, or intelligence whose conduct, conclusion, or expectation 
in relation to a particular circumstance, or fact is used as an objective standard by which 
to measure or determine something (as the existence of negligfence).  Merriam-Webster’s 
Dictionary of Law (1996). 
7 Disinterested is defined by the dictionary of English 
(http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/dictionaries/english/data/d0081934.html) as follows “If 
you are disinterested in something you are impartial and do not take sides: A disinterested 
observer of the scene would have wondered what all the fuss was about. If you are uninterested 
you have no interest at all: The player was uninterested in the public reaction to his remark. 
Disinterested is often used instead of uninterested to mean lacking interest. This use is 
widely regarded as incorrect and should be avoided, especially in formal writing.” 
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persons.8  This does not have at all the precision of a distance criterion, but, 
for all that, we maintain that it is far more satisfactory.9 
 
 
B. International Relations 
 
When the U.S. entered Viet Nam, the “hawks” claimed that this was only a 
defensive maneuver, in that the communists were intent upon conquering us, 
and would do so country by country, until they were poised at our jugular, 
having taken over every other nation in the world.  Why wait until they 
could invade us from their bases in Mexico and Canada?  Why not fight the 
enemy while they are still some distance away?  Theirs was the “Domino 
Theory”: once allow the enemy to gain a foothold, or, worse, to increase it, 
then like dominos all lined up, one falling would trigger all the others until we 
were undone. 
The “doves,” in contrast, took the position that this was arrant nonsense.  
The fate of a small country 10,000 miles from our borders was irrelevant to 
our own national security.  In the event, history seems to have proven the 
isolationists correct.  The communist north overran the non-communist 
southern part of the country, and, instead of the dominos leading to the de-
mise of the U.S., the ostensible beneficiary of this theory, the U.S.S.R. ended 
instead. 
Where, then, should the U.S. draw a “line in the sand,” stating so far but 
no further, if it is to maintain the distinction between and offensive and a de-
fensive foreign policy?  The Monroe Doctrine attempted to draw this line at 
the borders of North and South America.  Were this criterion employed, then 
a take-over by the armies of Cuba or Nicaragua would be seen as serious in-
deed, while what goes on in Viet Nam, or on the Korean Peninsula, or be-
tween the Arabs and the Israelis would be interpreted as outside of our 
sphere of interests. 
One difficulty with the hawkish interpretation is that any unrest, any-
where in the world, serves as a trip wire for the U.S., involving us in countries 
the only benefit of which is that we learn the spelling and location of out of 
                                                          
8 We choose the number 12 for illustrative purposes only because most juries in the U.S. 
are composed of this many people. Were the number, instead, 9 or 25, this would not 
change our point in the text. 
9 But not perfectly so, since it is so subjective.  We anxiously await an improved criterion. 
It cannot be denied, as a critic of ours stated, that “jurors' beliefs are influenced by their 
personal experiences, cultural, religious, political backgrounds.” But this applies to every-
one, without exception. 
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obscure cities.  Then, too, it is difficult to generalize this position.  E.g., if it is 
really only “defensive” for the U.S. to act in such a manner, and defense is 
the proper prerogative of all nations, then countries, hundreds of them, will 
be continually tripping over each other in very far corners of the globe. 
On the other hand, it would take a rather pacifist kind of government in 
the U.S. to look with equanimity at a hostile take over of the two countries 
which are our immediate neighbors, to our north and south, respectively.10  
The international analogue to the “reasonable man” standard in the case 
of domestic crime would appear to be to adopt a reasonable Martian or Venu-
sian standard.  Suppose that an inhabitant of one of these planets were look-
ing down upon us through a telescope powerful enough to register to move-
ment of armies, but was disinterested enough in earthly events to be able to 
adopt a judicial attitude with regard to them.  Would he characterize the 
U.S. as a world bully in the last half of the 20th century?  Based only on the 
fact that we had stationed troops all over the third planet, and that no other 
country had emulated us in this regard, it is difficult to resist this notion.11 
Consider the following argument, regarding the above:  “… maybe if the 
Venusians or Martians saw what the Communists and the terrorists did to 
their civilian populations, maybe they would agree that somebody had to do 
something to prevent such crimes. If someone saw a woman being raped, 
would he intervene or would he ask a reasonable man what he would do be-
fore intervening?” 
We do not accept this perspective. In our view it is simply not the job of 
the U.S. government to be the world’s policeman. Nowhere in the Constitu-
tion of the U.S. 
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.overview.html) is any 
such role articulated.12 Of course, all men of good will would try to stop a 
                                                          
10 However, it would be hard to deny that much of Soviet foreign policy was dedicated to 
the establishment of a cordon sanitaire around its own borders.  What is sauce for the 
goose would not appear to be so for the gander, at least in some circles. 
11 For the view that there is a sharp disanalogy between individuals on the one hand and 
national governments on the other, see Rothbard (1984). 
12 Not that this should be definitive. See on this Spooner. [1870] 1966: “It is true that the 
theory of our Constitution is that all taxes are paid voluntarily; that our government is a 
mutual insurance company, voluntarily entered into by the people with each other; that 
each man makes a free and purely voluntary contract with all others who are parties to 
the Constitution, to pay so much money for so much protection, the same as he does with 
any other insurance company; and that he is just as free not to be protected, and not to 
pay tax, as he is to pay a tax, and be protected. But this theory of our government is 
wholly different from the practical fact.  The fact is that the government, like a highway-
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rape in progress. But there is a disanalogy here. Suppose A hires B to be his 
bodyguard, and B, instead of protecting A, rushes off to stop a rape in pro-
gress across the street, leaving in danger the person he is contractually obli-
gated13 to protect. Would this bodyguard be justified in running off, even, 
stipulating, for a good purpose, to this end? Of course not. The point is, if the 
bodyguard wants to stop rapes on his own time, we can all applaud him for 
that. But, if he does so in direction contravention to his obligations, that 
conclusion cannot be justified.  
How does this translate into international relations? If this critic and oth-
ers like him wish to stop “rapes” abroad, let them do just that. But they are 
not justified in bringing in the U.S. government for that role, for just as in 
the case of the bodyguard, this organization has an entirely different task. 
Let this critic and his ilk follow the path of the International Brigades, in-
cluding the Abraham Lincoln Battalion aka “the Lincoln Brigade” 
(http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9042576) that fought in the Spanish Civil 
War of 1936-1939. We agree that “somebody had to do something to prevent 
such crimes.” We disagree that it had to be the U.S. government. 
Now consider the following point that could be made by a critic: “The au-
thors of this paper are correct in implicitly pointing that the U.S. facing ter-
rorists attacks may be due to past "bad" invasive foreign policy. However, 
one might argue that it is in the past, it's a sunk cost and nothing can be done 
to change the past.” 
Not so, not so. Of course, the critic is correct in his view that nothing can 
be done to rectify past mistakes. But, assume our thesis is correct. That 
means that every unnecessary and illicit action of the U.S. government14 over 
and above the limited role assigned to it by the Constitution creates prob-
lems. Yes, it applies to past events, about which nothing can now be done. 
But, it also holds true for present and future such acts, which are not yet 
“sunk costs.” That is, improper invasions now undertaken by the government 
will have negative repercussions in the future, and these can at present be ob-
viated.15 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
man, says to a man: ‘Your money, or your life.’  And many, if not most, taxes are paid 
under the compulsion of that threat.” 
13 Apologies to Spooner, here. 
14 This applies to all governments, not only that of the U.S. In our view, they all ought to 
be limited in scope. 
15 Ferguson (2000) argued in part that Britain's entry into what had been a European con-
flict between Germany and France escalated the conflict into The Great War (We owe this 
point to Bill Butos). See also Powell, 2005 (We owe this cite to Tom DiLorenzo) and Tay-
lor (1972, 1996). 
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III. Age of maturity 
 
When does a child become an adult, for legal purposes?  For some religions, 
confirmation can come as early as 9-13, which is, presumably, the number of 
years required before a person can make an informed decision on such mat-
ters. In many states of the union, a youngster can obtain a license to operate 
a motor vehicle when he is 14-16 years old.  School leaving ages, and the age 
before which a work permit can be issued, are of similar vintage.  The mili-
tary draft kicks in at 18, the drinking age and that for sexual consent varies 
between 18-21, the latter of which is required for voting.  No one may take 
the office of congressman before reaching age 30, nor may a president of the 
U.S. be sworn in before reaching 35.16 
 So which is it?  When does a child become an adult?  As with all contin-
uum problems, the solution does not lie in objective numbers. For no matter 
what age is selected, it is always possible to be critical, and reasonably so, on 
the ground that an age one day older or younger would also be justified.  It is 
always possible to point to those under this age who are more mature than 
some who exceed it.  Surely, there are some if only a few 12 year olds who act 
in a more adult manner than some who have reached the age of 21. 
Other criteria must instead be employed if the continuum problem is to be 
finessed.  One such is offered by Rothbard (1998).  Here, the criterion is not 
calendar years, but rather the type of human action, or homesteading, which 
is indicative of maturity.  The child becomes an adult in effect when he seizes 
control over himself by setting up his own household.  This might have to be 
done under the approval of a judge, but in this manner a modicum of com-
mon sense is inculcated into what would otherwise be a sterile objective crite-
rion.  States Rothbard (1998, p. 103) in this regard:  
“But when are we to say that this parental trustee jurisdiction over chil-
dren shall come to an end? Surely any particular age (21, 18, or whatever) 
can only be completely arbitrary. The clue to the solution of this thorny 
question lies in the parental property rights in their home. For the child has 
his full rights of self-ownership when he demonstrates that he has them in na-
ture—in short, when he leaves or “runs away” from home. Regardless of his 
age, we must grant to every child the absolute right to runaway and to find 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
16 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Constitution_Senate.htm 
WALTER BLOCK AND  WILLIAM BARNETT II 
 
 158
new foster parents who will voluntarily adopt him, or to try to exist on his 
own. Parents may try to persuade the runaway child to return, but it is to-
tally impermissible enslavement and an aggression upon his right of self-
ownership for them to use force to compel him to return. The absolute right 
to run away is the child’s ultimate expression of his right of self-ownership, 
regardless of age.” 
Age plays if anything an even more dramatic role in debates involving the 
earliest inception of the human being.  To wit, when does a fetus become a 
person?  The pro-choice movement argues for the time of birth.  The pro life 
faction locates the proper date at conception: the fertilized egg is a human be-
ing, since if not interfered with, that is the natural processes will result in 
that eventuality.  This debate is so highly documented and discussed it needs 
no further elucidation here.17   
In contrast, those who advocate the eviction theory in the abortion con-
troversy (Block, 1978, 2001, 2004c, unpublished; Block and Whitehead, 2005) 
offer an alternative answer to this continuum problem: whenever the fetus is 
viable outside of the womb, it becomes invested with the rights accorded 
human beings.  This date would of course change as medical technology ad-
vances (McElroy, 2005).  A century ago, this perspective would have given 
the answer offered by the pro-choice advocates: since the fetus was not viable 
outside of the womb until birth, it achieves human rights only at that time.  
A century hence, medically technology will presumably be so far advanced 
such that, according to this theory, the fetus at any stage of development will 
be invested with the same rights accorded all human beings.  At these rates of 
improvement, each decade, at present, will subtract a few days from this 
point; that is, every ten years or so from now, enough advances will have 
made such that a fetus of, say, a week younger will be able to be supported 
outside the placenta, in a test tube or host mother, or some such.  Thus, we 
arrive at a date for human life that is continually changing, and is not based 
upon any particular point on this continuum. 
A similar situation applies to the age at which statutory rape applies. That 
there must be such a law is clear; females below some cut off age point are 
simply incapable of engaging in consensual sexual relations. But at what 
level should this apply. Twelve seems far too young, and 21 too old. So is the 
correct age 14, 16, 18? Whichever age is picked, there will be girls younger 
than that who are more mature than others who are older. And what of the 
                                                          
17 For other libertarian theories pertaining to abortion, see Cobin, 1998; Long, 1993; 
McElroy, 2005; Rothbard, 1983. 
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age of the male involved? Surely, there is a difference in physical relations be-
tween a girl who is 16 and a boy who is 17, or a man who is 45. Cut off points 
of this sort simply cannot be derived in any straightforward manner from the 
law of non-aggression. There is a need for private competing courts18 and ju-
ries to decide such matters. 
 
 
IV. Homesteading 
 
According to libertarian theorists (Block, 1990; Hoppe, 1993; Locke, 1948; 
Rothbard, 1973, 32; Rozeff, 2005) virgin territory is initially brought into a 
state of ownership through homesteading.19  One mixes one’s labor with the 
land, and in that manner comes to own it. 
There are two margins for continua presented in such a scenario.  On the 
one hand, for how long does the homesteading have to occur before it can be 
said to be completed?  For one minute? Hour? Day? Week? Month? Year?  
The Homestead Act of 1862 required farmers to gather crops for five years20 
in a row before title devolved upon them.21  
One principled, no continuum way to solve this issue is to hark back to ag-
ricultural rhythms. That is, the homesteading must occur for at least one 
growing season, in the case of farmland.  After all, the goal in clearing land 
for this purpose is to get in a crop.  If sowing alone occurs, but not reaping, it 
can be said that the homesteading process is not complete. 
A second margin concerns the intensiveness or extensiveness of the farming 
that takes place, for however long it took.  E.g., does there need to be one 
wheat plant per square inch? Foot? Yard? Acre? Mile?  Indeed, stretch the 
extensiveness of the planting sufficiently, and homesteading devolves into 
claim theory, where the owner plants a flag at a point, and claims “as far as 
the eye can see” at the very least, on and up to an entire continent at the ex-
treme.22 
                                                          
18 See on this: Anderson and Hill (1979), Benson (1989, 1990), Fielding (1978), Friedman 
(1989), Hoppe (1993, 2001), Long (2004), Murphy (2002, 2005), Rothbard (1973, 1978, 
1982), Sneed (1977), Stringham, Edward (1998-1999), Tannehills (1984), Woolridge (1970). 
19 Property titles are subsequently justified on the basis of any and all voluntary commer-
cial and non-commercial interaction: sales, gifts, gambling, etc.  See on this Nozick, 1974. 
20 http://www.nps.gov/home/homestead_act.html 
21 See Anderson and Hill, 1979, 15, for a discussion of land claims regarding gold mining. 
22 In the interplanetary context, one could claim an entire planet, or moon, merely by 
mixing one’s labor with a very small part of it, provided that homesteading was inter-
preted in an extensive enough manner. 
WALTER BLOCK AND  WILLIAM BARNETT II 
 
 160
There is a way to address this problem that does not rely upon some neces-
sarily arbitrary point along the continuum: it is to resort to common (eco-
nomically efficient) practice.  For example, most farming east of the Missis-
sippi is done relatively intensively. Compared to what lies in the western part 
of the country, this land is irrigated, which supports intensive agriculture. 
West of the Mississippi, in contrast, acreage is dryer.  Vegetables, bushes and 
trees, etc., cannot be planted as close together; it takes more pasture to sup-
port a single cow.  These considerations cannot make fine distinctions, e.g., as 
to whether, in Iowa, the proper margin for corn is every one, two or three 
feet, but we can say, that whatever it is, it is more intensive than in the de-
sert areas of Utah.23 
 
 
V. On Buchanan and Rawls 
 
These two authors are far from favorites of ours. We regard the former’s re-
jection of anarchism as logically flawed, and what we consider his characteri-
zation of government as in effect a market participant as grievously mis-
taken.24 As to the latter, we see his “veil of ignorance” as highly problematic, 
in that it focuses only on the forced transfer of money from rich to poor, and 
ignores such more important attributes as intelligence, beauty, sense of hu-
mor, number of hair follicles, disposition toward happiness, etc. Why not 
transfer these from those who have “too much” of them, and to those who 
have too little? Also, even with regard to money, Rawls focuses solely on the 
U.S. Why not include the poor from the entire world in his calculation? This 
would, we contend, make his redistributionist schemes far less palatable.25 
Yet, whatever misgivings we have about the overall oeuvre of these two 
authors, it cannot be denied that we may learn from Rawls (1971) and Bu-
chanan (1976, 2000) in the present context, with regard to continuums. Take 
                                                          
23 The homesteading concerns in this section, and the question of human ownership in the 
previous one, are not totally unrelated.  This is because people attain ownership over 
themselves through a process that might be described as quasi homesteading.  At birth, 
the baby has no control over itself.  Its arm and leg motions are seemingly random.  After 
a few months, through a gradual process, growth changes occur in this regard.  At this 
age, the parents can kiss the infant at will.  But around the age of two the infant learns 
the word “No,” and can refuse to be kissed.  It is in this manner that we assert ownership 
over ourselves through a process of homesteading (e.g., using) our bodies. 
24 For support of these contentions, see DiLorenzo, 1990; Block and DiLorenzo, 2000, 
2001; DiLorenzo and Block, 2001; Rothbard, 1989, 1997. 
25 For an utter, total and complete evisceration of the views of Rawls on these matters, see 
Nozick (1974, 183-231). 
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Rawls first. The “veil of ignorance” is a technique employed by this author in 
order to place some objectivity into discussions of fairness or justice. We have 
rejected the implications he draws from this for income distribution. But we 
take the position that this can nevertheless shed light on continuums. For 
example, if one does not know, in advance, whether one will be shaking his 
fist at someone else, or, have his face subjected to the fist shaking of someone 
else, it may well be that a better line of demarcation between justified and 
unjustified fist shaking will be drawn than if one considers only one side of 
this issue. Or consider age of consent laws. Child molesters and parents of 
young children will obviously have different takes on this issue. But, if one 
does not know what role one will have in society, one is more likely to take a 
more reasonable position on the matter. Indeed, we see this as part and par-
cel of, and buttress for, our comments on the “reasonable man” criterion em-
ployed above. That is, the veil of ignorance can be employed to increase the 
“reasonableness” of man. 
Buchanan’s work, too, can shed light on the conundrums we have ad-
dressed in this paper.26 One could conceivably interpret his contribution to 
political economy as an attempt to bridge the gap between, the centripetal 
forces of anarchism, as he sees them, on the one hand, and on the other hand 
the centrifugal forces of statism on the other. In one direction lies the Scylla 
of excessive individualism; anarchy is chaos, for Buchanan. In another lies 
the Carbides of unwarranted centralization; if the government is too power-
ful, who guards us from the Leviathans?  Buchanan sees the range between 
these two extremes as a continuum. His solution to this problem is a consti-
tution.  We need not agree with him on this to acknowledge that his analysis 
of continuums is not unrelated to our own.  
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
We have attempted to make that case that there are continuum problems27 
that beset libertarian theory. It is impossible to non-arbitrarily set precise 
limits in terms of age of majority, homesteading, salvage, and other impor-
tant aspects of libertarian law. We conclude from this not any shortcoming in 
                                                          
26 See also Brubaker, 1975; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962.  
27 For other treatments of this phenomenon, see Graff, 2002; Sainsbury and Williamson, 
1997; Sorensen, 2001; Varzi, 2003. 
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the principles of non aggression but rather the importance of private institu-
tions in the law industry. 
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